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Investors in private corporations face unique problems relating to corporate control, illiquidity and
valuation of securities. In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations. Our sample
includes both private and public firms. Major findings of our research are as follows: Private firms use
written shareholder agreements for safeguarding ownership interests and dividend payments. Family
owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms. Insiders of private firms own a much
larger proportion of common stock than insiders in public firms, and the CEOs of private firms often
happen to be the largest stockholders.
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The size of executive teams and boards are smaller in private firms than in public firms.
However, the proportion of executives and board members who are also stockholders of the firm is larger
in public firms. We find that a greater percentage of members on boards of private firms are outsiders,
consistent with the arguments about the need for outside board members for objectivity and resolving
conflicts among the closely-related stockholders. Our research also documents evidence relating to
illiquidity of stock ownership and the different valuation approaches used in private firms.
Introduction
Privately-held (or private) firms comprise a vast majority of for-profit business enterprises in the
United States, and they are vital for the well being of U.S. economy. According to a report by the U.S.
Small Business Administration, during the period 1990-95 small firms (employees <=500) accounted for
90.1 percent of new establishments and 76.5 percent of net new jobs. Nevertheless, research on small
firms is scant, probably for want of readily available data or less enthusiasm on the part of academicians.
Further, the findings from research on large, public corporations are for the most part inadequate to
explain the agency relationships and corporate control issues in small, private firms for several reasons.
The issues relating to agency problems and corporate governance issues in large corporations
have been widely discussed in the financial literature [For example, see Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Easterbrook (1984), and
Barnea et al. (1985)]. Primarily, the research emphasizes the agency relationships between i) managers
and equity holders, and ii) equity and debt holders. Managers of large corporations, with very little or no
equity interests in the firm but with control over the firm's resources, would have incentives to
expropriate wealth from equity holders at large through shirking, excessive perk consumption, and
expense preference behavior.
The nature of agency problems and issues relating to corporate governance in private firms are
substantially different from that in large corporations. In private firms, those who contribute most or a
major part of equity capital hold control over the firm‟s affairs and the minority shareholders, having
little control over the firm‟s affairs, tend to be in a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, stockholders
face liquidity problems because of the small number of investors, lack of a ready market for the firm's
stock, and information limitations. The mechanisms for disciplining the managers of large corporations,
i.e., capital market resolutions, regulatory discipline, and takeover possibilities are not generally
available to the stockholders of private firms.
Owing to these peculiarities in private firms, it is apparent that researchers should examine issues
relating to corporate control, distribution of cash flows, and valuation of securities in those firms apart
from the widely available research findings on large corporations. Extant literature on small business
finance so far has largely focused on examination of corporate financial policies (e.g., capital structure
and working capital management) compared to issues concerning corporate governance, shareholder
agreements, and valuation of common stock. This paper attempts to fill the gap by examining the data
generated from a nation-wide survey of private firms conducted during the year 1998. Our paper is
unique in several ways. First, it examines the role and importance of written shareholder agreements as a
mechanism for establishing shareholder rights in private firms. Second, it ties in the corporate
governance structure (composition of executive teams and boards of directors) to ownership differences
and CEO profiles in private firms. Third, the paper makes a detailed examination of illiquidity and
valuation of common stock in private firms. Although our emphasis is on private firms, we will make
comparisons with public firms using the data on public firms obtained in the same survey. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. Section I contains a review of relevant literature. In Section II we will
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present a description of the survey data and results. Section III will provide a summary of the paper and
our concluding remarks.
I.

Literature Review
In this section we will review the literature pertaining to shareholder agreements, corporate
governance (management teams and board composition), illiquidity of corporate securities, and methods
for valuation of common stock in close corporations.
A.
Shareholder Agreements
Typically, the corporate structure of large, publicly owned corporations provides for control of
the firm‟s affairs by the charter and bylaws, proxy system, and majority voting. However, shareholders in
close corporations often like to act as partners without being constrained by the majority vote limitations
of corporate structure. Thus, shareholders‟ agreements similar to partnership deeds have come into
vogue. Myers (2000) has developed a model in which he makes one important assumption, i.e., outsiders
cannot prevent insiders from capturing part or all of operating cash flow. His model as it applies to
partnerships shows that the agreements typically cover items such as specify ownership shares,
dividends, and the commitment of assets to the firm. When viewed from the perspective of a closely-held
corporation, the shareholder agreements provide for a low cost negotiating tool for the equity holders,
both inside and outside. The stockholders' agreements are generally drawn at the time the firm is
organized, and they cover such items as employment and compensation of stockholder-employees,
dividend policy, protection against dilution of ownership interests, sale of stock to outsiders, and
amendments to charter or bylaws.
Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow (1982), Buchholz, Crane, and Nager (1999), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon
(2000), and O‟Neal and Thompson (2000), among others, discuss the usefulness of written stockholders‟
agreements in resolving conflicts between shareholders of close corporations. Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow
state that their purpose is to limit powers normally vested in corporate stockholders and the board of
directors. According to O‟Neal and Thompson (2000), the primary objective of shareholders‟ agreements
is to protect the minority shareholder against the power vested in the majority by the principle of majority
rule and permit the minority shareholder to obtain membership on the board of directors or some other
voice in the management of the corporation. This view is further strengthened by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) who argue that the issue concerning expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling
shareholders is even more important than the issue of agency costs associated with expropriation of all
shareholders by managers.
Buchholz, Crane, and Nager (1999) argue that shareholder agreements are critical for
documenting shareholder rights for maintaining smooth relationships among shareholders of family
businesses and that the agreement can “assure continued family ownership and provide an „escape‟
mechanism for disgruntled owners” (p.166). Further, they state, “If any owner decides that he cannot
tolerate the way business is being run, that agreement will provide the terms under which he can sell his
stock. Co-owners and co-managers must not be held hostage to each other if relationships go south. A
buy-sell agreement is the ultimate pressure relief valve that can keep the family from blowing up”(p.
158).
The question of legal validity of shareholders‟ agreements has been widely discussed by O‟Neal
and Thompson (2000). From their discussion, prior to 1960 courts generally invalidated shareholders‟
agreements on the basis of their inconsistency with the statutory provisions conferred on the board of
directors. However, since 1960 „courts and legislators have shown an increased sensitivity to the need of
closed corporations to depart from the traditional statutory norms. In discussing the veto powers of

4

shareholders in close corporations, O‟Neal and Thompson state that in several states veto arrangements
in shareholders‟ agreements are enforceable.
In accepting shareholders‟ agreements as valid contracts, courts seem to have taken the approach
of (1) permitting participants in close corporations to depart from traditional statutory norms, and (2)
protecting minority shareholders. As examples of legal validation for shareholders‟ agreements, we refer
to some court cases described in O‟Neal and Thompson. In an Illinois case, Galler vs. Galler (1964), the
shareholders‟ agreement called for, among other things, declaration of dividends if the firm earned
surplus in excess of $500,000. Another provision required the company to purchase a sufficient number
of shares from a deceased participant‟s estate in order to pay for the estate and inheritance taxes. The
intermediate appellate court decided against the agreement but it was subsequently upheld by the Illinois
Supreme Court. In the case of Weber v. Sidney (1963) the court held an oral agreement about division of
the earnings and profits of a corporation between two shareholders to be valid and enforceable. In
another case, Wasserman v. Rosengarden (1980) „court upheld the validity of an oral agreement among
all the shareholders of a close corporation providing for election of the parties there to as directors and
officers and for an equal distribution of salaries and profits as long as the parties remained shareholders
or the corporation remained in existence.‟ In Adler v. Svingos (1981), the court upheld an agreement
requiring unanimous consent of all shareholders on all corporate matters to be valid, and did not violate
the provisions of the New York Business Corporate Law.
B.
Corporate Control and Governance
In corporations, control is vested in two bodies in a firm, i.e., the board of directors and the top
management. According to Neubauer and Lank (1998), the key elements of a typical corporate
governance structure in family-controlled businesses are the family (and its institutions), the board of
directors, and top management. In large, public corporations the board of directors has the important role
of monitoring and controlling the firm's top management with the objective of protecting the
shareholders' interests, in addition to fulfilling its statutory obligations as required by corporate laws. The
board‟s monitoring role is vital for mitigating agency problems between managers and stockholders as
discussed, for example, in Jensen and Meckling (1976). In private corporations, however, the board's role
is different in nature. There is very little need for the board to monitor the performance of top
management for two reasons. First, the management teams consist mostly of the stockholders themselves,
and outsiders, if any, on management teams are few. Second, more often than not, the members on the
board are the same as those of the management team. Third, the board's primary purpose in small firms
would, therefore, be to fulfill the statutory requirements and involve itself in the firm's affairs in several
other ways.
Empirical studies using data from large publicly owned corporations, for example Bathala and
Rao (1995), have found that outside directors on the board play an important role in mitigating agency
conflicts between management and shareholders. Contrary to this, according to Mace (1948) board
members of small firms advise more on the operational areas than play a major role in the formulation of
higher level strategies or monitoring of top management. Outside members on boards, not restricted by
family or personal loyalties, were found to be extremely effective in training the presidents of their firms
to be better administrators. The outside board members were also helpful to firms in matters such as
helping in management succession, raising bank loans, interviewing candidates for jobs, or offering
suggestions for improving the firm's operating performance. Outside directors were also seen to play a
valuable role in pacifying the differences among major stockholders or key executives who, most often,
happen to be the members of the same family or close relatives. Further, firms with minority shareholders
often elected one or more outsiders with unquestionable character as members of their boards. Mace
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states, "the presence of such a person or persons on the board constituted considerable assurance to the
minority stockholders that the enterprise would be operated on a plane of high standards."
Castaldi and Wortman (1984) identify five attributes of board members which are especially
valuable to small firms. These factors are equity ownership, technical expertise, management experience,
special economic service, and broad economic specification. Neubauer and Lank (1998) observe that
outside members in family businesses are a valuable resource in several ways. They refer to a seminar
with participants from 141 family-controlled firms. The responses from the seminar participants showed
that 79 percent of the firms had mixed boards. The responses further indicated that family-controlled
businesses value outside directors for their expertise, consultancy, objectivity, neutrality, and outside
view, among others. In contrast to this, on the basis of a survey of Inc. 500 companies, Ford (1988)
concluded that outside directors are of less value than inside directors. He conjectured that it could be
due to the outsiders' lack of knowledge about the firm and its environment, and their lack of availability
for consulting except during meetings.
The literature reviewed above touches upon just one limitation of the small firms‟ management
teams, i.e., their deficiencies in management aspects. Other important attributes of management teams
such as the size, composition, and roles of majority vs. minority stockholders on management teams, and
their implications to agency and corporate control have not been examined. This research attempts to fill
the void in that respect.
C.
Illiquidity and Valuation Issues
With about 25 million businesses in operation in the USA and less than one-half of one percent
traded in any meaningful way, the need for valuation and a review of the issues as they pertain to small
and/or privately-held businesses is large and increasing. Traditional equity valuation models (e.g., the
Capital Asset Pricing Model and Dividend Discount Models) rely upon past prices, dividends, and
historical growth rates in order to evaluate risk-return potentials in valuing common stocks. Those
valuation models cannot be used for private firms that have no trading in common stock. Further, as
Damodaran (1996) points out, even historical earnings, growth rates, and cash-flow estimations of private
firms are often unreliable because of the difficulty in distinguishing between management compensation
and return on capital. Owing to these limitations, comparative valuations or use of independent
appraisers are likely to serve as suitable approaches for valuing privately owned stock.
In a survey of members of the American Society of Appraisers (ASA) and the Institute of
Business Appraisers (IBA), Dukes, Bowlin, and Ma (DBM) (1996) identified ten approaches which were
reported to be used in the process of valuing privately-held businesses. The numerous methods of
valuation and the lack of consistency in valuations have been addressed in the Central Trust Case (1962),
by Hubbard and Waldron (1988), Waldron and Hubbard (1991), and Dukes (2001). The issues of nonmarketability and control premiums have been addressed in different ways by different authors but with
the same intent - that of explaining why a closely-held firm should be valued in ways that show the
illiquid nature of the small firm. Emory (1995) has made and published seven studies covering the overall
time period of 1985-1995. The research on small-firm valuations, however, has not related the
approaches to the differences in ownership and corporate governance. Further, the underlying corporate
governance and control factors as they relate to the illiquidity of the ownership in private companies have
also not been fully explored. This research will seek to determine if agency relationships, differences in
ownership structure, and corporate governance issues have a bearing on the stock valuation methods and
liquidity of ownership interests in private firms.
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II.

Data and Results
A.
Data
The data for the study is obtained using a survey instrument. The firms in the Standard & Poor‟s
Directory of Corporations, 1997, listed in approximately 3,000 pages, formed the initial population of
firms for our survey. For our sample, we selected one firm from each page (the first firm at the top of
left-hand column). Then, we eliminated certain not-for-profit entities (hospitals, universities, etc.) from
the list and ended up with a mailing list of 2,870 firms – 2,251 private firms (78.4 percent) and 619
public firms (21.6 percent). The survey was anonymous and the questionnaire was not marked in order to
ensure anonymity of responding firms. The survey instrument was four pages long and it sought
information on ownership/governance issues, shareholder agreements, sale/transfer of ownership, and
financial policies.
The survey questionnaires were mailed in the month of August, 1998. A total of 275 firms
provided responses of which 253 were usable, for a response rate of 8.8 percent. There were 75
envelopes that came back as undeliverable. We suspect that the response rate could be low due to small
size and private ownership of firms in the mailing list, and the 4-page questionnaire that we used to elicit
information on different topic areas. The President or CEO of the company provided as much as 74.5
percent of the responses, but the proportion of responses provided by them is higher for publicly owned
firms (78 percent) than for privately owned firms (61 percent). However, from the data analysis and
comparisons presented below, we note that the responding firms are representative of the firms in the
population.
Table I contains distributions of sample firms by ownership type (Panel A), business activity
(Panel B), and company size in sales (Panel C). Out of the total of 253 responding firms, 202 (79.8
percent) are privately owned and 51 (20.2 percent) are publicly owned. By business activity, a little over
50 percent of the firms are in manufacturing. The firms in trading (wholesale/retail) and service sectors
comprise 10.8 percent and 7.6 percent of sample firms, respectively. In size, firms in the smallest size
group with sales of $25 million or less formed the largest group (61.7 percent). However, the distribution
differs with ownership type -- as much as 70.4 percent of private firms belong to the smallest size group
compared to only 27.4 percent of public firms. At the other extreme, we find fewer private firms (7.5
percent) in the group of firms with sales over $100 million, compared to 53.0 percent of firms from the
category of public firms. Since a vast majority of sample firms, both private and public, have sales less
than $500 million any generalizations we make from the findings in our study would apply primarily to
firms in the small business environment.
Next, we examine if the firms that responded to the survey questionnaire are representative of the
firms in the mailing list. Table I, Panel D, contains the comparative data of firms in the mailing list
(population) and in the survey responses (sample). As can be seen, the distribution of firms by sales (<=
$100 million and > $100 million) is quite similar for both the population and the sample. In sales, firms
up to $100 million consisted of 87.8 percent of all firms in the population, which compares well with the
83.7 percent of the responding firms belonging to that category. The response rates for private and public
firms are also remarkably consistent for the most part. The response rates for private and public firms
were 9.0 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively, compared to the overall response rate of 8.8 percent for all
firms. On the basis of these observations, we believe that the responding firms are representative of the
firms in the population.
B.
Results
As mentioned before, our focus in this survey is on private firms but we will make comparisons
between private and public firms as appropriate. Further, we present our analysis separating the sample
firms into different size and ownership groups. For statistical analyses, we employ Chi-square tests and t-
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tests. The survey findings are divided into three major areas – corporate governance and control,
illiquidity of ownership interests, and valuation of common stock.
Corporate Control and Governance. We analyze the survey responses relating to questions about
corporate control and governance in three different ways. First, we discuss shareholder agreements and
the matters covered in those agreements. Second, we analyze the differences in shareholder agreements
by the ownership type, ownership dispersion, inside ownership differences, and the CEO profiles. Third,
we examine the differences in the composition of management teams and boards of directors.
Shareholder Agreements. In private firms, ownership and management are generally
concentrated in a few individuals. Discussion in prior literature (e.g., Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow, 1982)
suggests that written shareholder agreements provide a foundation for corporate control and governance
in private firms. They are helpful in establishing shareholder rights and in reducing agency and
information problems relating to equity investments in private firms. We gathered information relating to
shareholder agreements using two questions in our survey instrument. The first question asked whether
or not the company has a written „shareholders‟ agreement‟ covering matters that impact the rights and
privileges of common stockholders. The second question asked the firms to indicate if they have written
or established guidelines (procedures) for specific matters relating to shareholders‟ interests. The
responses to these questions relating to shareholder agreements are summarized in Table II (Panels A, B,
and C).
The summary data in Table II (Panel A) show that a total of 120 firms (49.8 percent of
responses) have written shareholder agreements. Out of those 120 firms having written shareholder
agreements, 102 firms are private (52 percent of private firms) and 18 firms are public (40 percent of
public firms). The differences are not statistically significant (Chi-square = 2.12; p-value = 0.1452).
Panel B (Table II) provides a summary of responses relating to the various matters covered in
shareholder agreements. In case of private firms, matters intended to protect shareholders‟ equity stakes
and cash-flow rights are most prominent in shareholder agreements. In the order of declining importance,
they are (1) sale, transfer, or buy-back of stock (107 firms, 74.3 percent), (2) proxy and voting procedures
(71 firms, 49.3 percent), (3) valuation of company stock (71 firms, 49.3 percent), and (4) preemptive
rights in equity offerings or when someone is selling (52 firms, 36.1 percent). In case of public firms, the
top four items in their order of importance are: (1) proxy and voting procedures (44 firms, 97.8 percent),
(2) payment of dividends (23 firms, 51.1 percent), (3) sale, transfer, or buy-back of stock (17 firms, 37.8
percent), and (4) mergers, reorganization, or sale of the firm (13 firms, 28.9 percent). Clearly, with the
market pricing mechanism in place, agreements concerning valuation of common stock is not important
for stockholders of public firms compared to their high importance for stockholders of private firms.
Agreements relating to dividend payments seem to be more important for investors in public firms than
for investors in private firms.
In Panel C (Table II), we focus on private firms and conduct further analysis of the differences in
shareholder agreements according to ownership type, insider ownership, and the CEO‟s profile. We
concentrate on three items that are prominent in shareholder agreements – sale/transfer of common stock,
dividend payments, and proxy/voting procedures. On the basis of the Chi-square statistics, we find that
the group differences are statistically significant in most cases.
Agreements relating to sale/transfer of common stock are most common in closely-held firms
(89.1 percent) followed by family-owned firms (69.1 percent) and widely-held firms (57.1 percent). The
differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 8.67; p-value = 0.0131). This suggests that having
control over ownership rights is more critical for stockholders in family-owned and closely-held
businesses than for the shareholders of widely-held firms. Contrary to this, agreements relating to
dividend payments and proxy/voting procedures are more common in widely-held firms than in either
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closely-held or family-owned businesses. In widely-held firms, not every owner can expect to be an
executive or employee of the firm and derive monetary compensation in the form of salaries or perks.
Therefore, ensuring rights to cash flows and their distribution seems to be more critical for shareholders
of widely-held firms. Further, following the analysis in Rozeff (1982), it can be argued that firms with
widely dispersed stock ownership would attempt to mitigate equity agency costs by establishing
shareholder rights to dividends through agreements written in advance. In widely-held firms, because of
the diffused ownership, it appears that stockholders‟ main concern is protecting their interests by
safeguarding the procedures relating to proxy and voting rights rather than through agreements about
sale/transfer of common stock.
The relative importance of shareholder agreements also seems to vary with differences in insider
ownership levels. Agreements about sale/transfer of ownership are slightly more prominent in firms with
high concentrations of insider ownership (over 50 percent) than in firms with low concentrations of
insider ownership (50 percent or less). This finding lends support to the earlier finding that owners with
greater concentrations of stock ownership tend to safeguard their control over the firm by means of
agreements relating to sale/transfer of common stock.
Agreements relating to dividend payments and proxy/voting procedures are less important in
firms in which the CEO happens to be the largest shareholder compared to those in which the CEO is not
the largest shareholder. The differences between the groups are statistically significant. This appears to
be contrary to the intuition that, in order to protect minority interests, shareholder agreements relating to
dividends and proxy/voting procedures should be more prevalent in firms with CEOs entrenched in both
ways, through ownership and power. A finding contrary to this expectation suggests that minority
shareholders have fewer rights and less protection for their interests in firms.
Ownership Differences. The survey responses relating to ownership differences and CEO
profiles are summarized in Table III. In Panel A we present a summary of responses relating to the
dispersion of stock ownership in our sample firms. For the entire sample, family owned corporations
comprise the largest proportion (52.2 percent), but the proportion is significantly higher for private firms
compared to the proportion for public firms (64.2 percent versus 2.1 percent). At the other extreme, in the
category of widely-held firms, a meager 7.2 percent of firms are private compared to a staggering 72.9
percent of public firms. The Chi-square statistic of 111.44 (p-value < 0.0001) indicates that the
ownership differences are statistically significant. This evidence confirms the private firms‟ need for
keeping corporate control in just a few hands. Corroborating this evidence, in Panel B, we present data
on the percentage of stock owned by corporate insiders. Corporate insiders own 50 percent or more of the
firm‟s equity in 145 private firms (75.1 percent) compared to just 5 firms (10 percent) in public firms. At
the lower end, only in 48 private firms (24.9 percent) the insider ownership is less than or equal to 50
percent compared to 45 firms (90 percent) in public firms. The inside ownership differences between
private and public companies are also statistically significant (Chi-square = 73.49; p-value < 0.0001).
Next, we analyze the ownership profiles of CEOs. From Panel C, we note that in 120 private
firms (62.8 percent) the CEO is the largest stockholder whereas in only 11 public firms (22.5 percent) the
CEO is the largest stockholder. The differences across the two groups, private vs. public, are statistically
significant (Chi-square = 25.65; p-value < 0.0001). This finding further strengthens our priors that
ownership and control go hand-in-hand in private firms. In response to the question whether the CEO is a
founding member of the company, a total of 77 firms (32.1 percent) answered in the affirmative. The
breakdown for private and public firms shows no significant differences between them (Chi-square =
0.4965; p-value = 0.7502). We anticipated to see a larger proportion of founders to be the firms‟ CEOs in
private firms compared to public firms. The finding of no significant differences between private and
public firms in the founder being the firm‟s CEO came as a surprise. It is conceivable that more younger
firms may have founding members as CEOs compared to older firms.
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In order to verify our conjecture, we separated the sample firms into two groups by their age –
young firms in the age group of < = 25 years (52 firms) and old firms in the age group of 25 years and
older (188 firms) and examined the frequency distributions (frequency tables not provided in the paper).
Founders are CEOs in 35 young firms (67.3 percent) compared to 41 old firms (21.8 percent) belonging
to the older group. The differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 38.97; p-value < 0.0001).
The differences are even more dramatic in private firms than in public firms. In private firms, founders
are CEOs in 21 out of 27 firms (77.8 percent) belonging to the category of younger firms compared to 38
out of 164 firms (23.2 percent) belonging to the category of older firms. The differences are statistically
significant (Chi-square = 32.38; p-value < 0.0001). In public firms, the founders are CEOs in 14 out of 25
firms (56.0 percent) belonging to the category of younger firms compared to 3 out of 24 firms (12.5
percent) belonging to the category of older firms. The differences are statistically significant (Chi-square
= 10.226; p-value = 0.0014). These findings do show that more often than not, we will find founderCEOs in younger firms, and more so in private firms than in public firms.
In a recent article, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (1999) analyze a model of closely held
corporations. The authors show that founders of firms can optimally choose an ownership structure with
several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. According to their model,
the initial owners may in their own interests dilute their own power by distributing votes among several
large shareholders, and this dilution of power commits them to form a coalition to obtain control. Further,
the analysis in the paper implies that allowing the shareholders to freely trade shares will render an
ownership structure with many significant owners unstable. Thus, initial owners seem to distribute voting
rights only to those who are less likely to take control away from their hands.
We have analyzed the survey responses in order to verify the validity of the results shown in
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon‟s model of privately held corporations. If founders prefer an ownership
structure that provides a strong coalition among shareholders, then one would expect to observe a
dominance of family owned ownership structure in firms with founders as CEOs. The survey data
(frequency table not included in the paper) show that 61.0 percent of founder-CEO companies are family
owned compared to 65.6 percent of nonfounder-CEO companies. If allowing shareholders to freely trade
shares renders an ownership structure unstable, then one would expect to find a higher degree of
restrictions or prohibition on stock trading in founder-CEO companies than in nonfounder-CEO
companies. We find 33.3 percent of founder-CEO firms to have total prohibition on sale/transfer of
common stock compared to 16.5 percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. At the other extreme, only 7.8
percent of founder-CEO firms allow for unrestricted sale/transfer of common stock compared to 26.5
percent of firms with nonfounder-CEOs. These differences are statistically significant (Chi-square =
11.58; p-value = 0.009). Another dimension for keeping the coalition together is by requiring approvals
for sale/transfer of company‟s stock. Our data show that every sale/transfer of common stock requires
approval in 76.2 percent of founder-CEO firms, compared to 53.6 percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. At
the other extreme, only 9.5 percent of founder-CEO firms do not require an approval compared to 33.0
percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. The group differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 8.976;
p-value = 0.0112).
The above findings are generally consistent with the results shown by the model in Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon‟s article. The founders of private firms seem to be concerned about keeping the coalition
together by placing restrictions/prohibition on trading in the company‟s common stock and also by
requiring approval for sale/transfer of stock ownership.
Composition of Management Teams of Boards of Directors. In Table IV, we present summary
data relating to our survey questions about management teams (Panel A) and board composition (Panel
B). On average, the size of management teams is much smaller in private firms compared to public firms
(5.02 versus 11.84). Further, the proportion of executives who are also stockholders of the company is
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much smaller in private firms compared to public firms (57.0 percent versus 95.0 percent). The mean
differences between private and public firms are statistically significant (p-values < 0.0001). What is
surprising is the finding that the proportion of stockholder-executives is smaller in private firms than in
public firms. This could be due to a couple of reasons – (1) private firms could be hiring outsiders in
managerial positions for want of talent within among stockholders, and (2) executives in private firms
may not receive stock options or stock ownership as a part of their compensation which is often the case
with the executive compensation in public firms. In order to verify this, we looked into the existence of
stock option plans for executives in private and public firms. Out of the 47 firms which have stock option
plans for the firms‟ managers, 33 (70.2 percent) are public firms.
In Panel B (Table IV), we present data to analyze the differences in board composition between
private and public firms. The size of boards is smaller in private firms compared to public firms (4.53
versus 8), and the difference is statistically significant (T-ratio = 7.77; p-value <0.0001). Further, on
average, the proportion of board members who are also the firm‟s stockholders is smaller in private firms
than in public firms (70.8 percent versus 94.7 percent) and the mean difference is statistically significant
(T-ratio = 5.23; p-value < 0.0001). This is consistent with the previous finding of a smaller proportion of
executives who are also stockholders for private firms. Further, the proportion of board members who are
also on the firm‟s management team is higher in private firms compared to the proportion in public firms
(62.1 percent versus 29.8 percent) and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant
(T-ratio = 7.48; p-value < 0.0001). This finding concurs with the general expectation that power in
private firms would be concentrated in a few individuals who are on both the executive team and the
board of directors. However, the proportion of board of directors who are neither stockholders nor on the
management team (outside board members) is larger in private firms compared to the proportion in
public firms (19.5 percent versus 8.1 percent) and the difference is statistically significant (T-ratio =
2.93; p-value = 0.0037). This could be due to a need in private firms (which are generally smaller) for
seeking outsiders for talent that is lacking in stockholders or managers. It could also be due to having
close affiliates of major shareholders who are neither shareholders nor on the firm‟s management team
on the firm‟s board.
Both Mace (1948) and Neubauer and Lank (1998) emphasized the need for outside directors in
family-controlled business for their expertise, objectivity, and outside perspective. We examined the data
to verify if family-owned private firms have a larger proportion of outside directors than those which are
widely-held. The data (frequency table not included in the paper) show that family-owned firms have the
highest proportion of outside directors (22.0 percent), compared to 14.7 percent in closely-owned firms
and 19.1 percent in widely-held firms. These differences seem to provide support for the contention that
family-controlled firms prefer to have outside directors. Although it sounds paradoxical, potential serious
conflicts among family members could be a reason why family-owned firms have the highest proportion
of outside directors. This finding contrasts the evidence reported in Bathala and Rao (1995) where they
found a negative relationship between inside ownership and outside directors on the board in support of
the argument that they are substitute mechanisms for controlling agency problems in firms.
Illiquidity of Stock Ownership. Lack of active market and restrictions on sale or transfer of
ownership are two aspects of illiquidity associated with the equity investment in private firms. In our
survey, we sought information about the liquidity of stock ownership and summarized the responses in
Table V. The questions referred to both sale and transfer of common stock holdings in eliciting responses
from firms.
The summary data in Panel A (Table V) indicate the magnitude of illiquidity in the common
stock of private firms. As many as 95 of a total of out of 232 firms that have responded to the question do
not have any trading in common stock, and not surprisingly all of them are private firms. They comprise
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52.2 percent of private firms. In an additional 45.6 percent of private firms stock trading is infrequent.
Compared to this, in only 6 percent for public firms the stock trading is infrequent. In only four out of
182 private firms (2.2 percent) the stock trading is frequent. Daily trading takes place in the common
stock of 41 firms, which are all public firms. It translates to 17.7 percent of all responding firms or 82
percent of public firms. The differences in trading between the groups are statistically significant (Chisquare = 200.68; p-value < 0.0001).
We conducted further analysis of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms according to
ownership differences and firm size. On the basis of frequency distributions and Chi-square statistics
(tables not presented), we find group differences to be statistically significant according to ownership
differences but not according to the classification by firm size. Out of the four private firms with
„Frequent‟ trading, two are closely-held and two are widely-held. In size, two firms have sales in the
smallest size category ($25 million or less), and the other two firms are in the sales range of $50 - $250
million.
The summary data presented in Panel B reveal that restrictions on sale or transfer of common
stock are widely prevalent in private firms. Unrestricted sale or transfer of common stock is allowed in
only 37 private firms (21.1 percent), compared to 46 public firms (92 percent). As many as 101 private
firms (57.7 percent) have restrictions on sale or transfer of common stock to varying degrees, and in the
other 37 private firms (21.1 percent) there exists a prohibition on sale or transfer of common stock is
prohibited. In those firms which have prohibition against sale or transfer; the stock can only be sold back
to the company. The differences in restrictions on sale or transfer of common stock are statistically
significant (Chi-square = 85.53; p-value < 0.0001). We further examined the frequency distributions of
private firms according to firm size and ownership differences (frequency tables not presented). On the
basis of Chi-squares, we find that the group differences are statistically significant according to
ownership differences, but not according to firm size differences. In the „Unrestricted‟ group, only 54
percent of the firms are family owned, compared to approximately 70 percent of the firms in the
„Prohibited‟ group.
The data in Panel C (Table V) provide information about the requirement of company approval
for sale or transfer of common stock. Every sale or transfer requires company approval in 92 firms, all of
which are private firms (45.3 percent of all firms or 59.3 percent of private firms). In 23 firms only sale
or transfer of stock to non-affiliates require company approval, of which 21 are private firms. No
approval is required in 88 firms of the entire sample. Of those firms, 42 are private (27.1 percent of
private firms) and 46 are public (95.8 percent of public firms). These differences are statistically
significant (Chi-square = 71.28; p-value < 0.0001). Further analysis shows no statistically significant
differences according to either firm size or ownership differences (frequency tables not presented).
However, it would be pertinent to note that 66.3 percent of the 92 private firms in which every
sale/transfer requires approval are family owned, compared to 58.5 percent of the 42 private firms in
which no approvals are required.
The frequency of trading in private firms is probably associated with the restrictions on sale or
transfer of stock ownership in those firms, i.e., the more the restrictions the less the frequency of trading.
In order to verify if there is such a relationship, we examine the frequency distribution between trading
frequency and restrictions on sale or transfer of stock ownership presented in Panel D (Table V). As can
be seen, stock trading has never occurred in a total of 88 private firms. Of those firms, 63 (71.6 percent)
have high restrictions or prohibition on sale/ transfer of stock ownership. At the other extreme, firms in
which frequent trading occurs do not have either high restrictions or prohibition on sale/transfer of
common stock. The group differences are statistically significant (Chi-square statistic = 20.96; p-value =
0.0019).
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A similar analysis of the frequency distribution between trading frequency and the requirement
of approval for sale or transfer of common stock (frequency table not provided) shows a similar pattern.
Every sale/transfer of common stock requires company approval in as high as 71.6 percent of firms
which had no trading in common stock, compared to about 50 percent of firms in the other two groups
(firms requiring no approval or an approval is required only for sale/transfer to outsiders). The group
differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 12.20; p-value = 0.0159).
Two out of the 48 public firms reported that only sale/transfer of stock to outsiders requires
approval. We examined the characteristics of those two firms to discern more about this requirement
which is uncharacteristic of firms whose stock trade publicly. Both firms are closely-held. One of them
has two classes of common stock that differ in voting rights, whereas the other has cumulative voting for
the election of board of directors. The executive teams and boards of directors have a similar
composition in both firms. All executives and board members own stock in their company and neither
company has outside directors. However, they differ significantly in size, one with sales over $1 billion
and the other with sales under $25 million. In the smaller firm the CEO is a founding member as well as
the largest stockholder whereas in the larger company the CEO is neither a founding member nor the
largest stockholder.
Valuation of Common Stock. In Table VI we present a summary of responses relating to the
methods of common stock valuation. In private firms, the top three methods of valuing common stock are
-- (1) independent appraisers/arbitrators (79 firms; 52.3 percent), (2) multiple of book-value approach (63
firms; 41.7 percent), and (3) discounted cash-flow approach (10 firms; 6.6 percent) -- in that order. In
public firms, as anticipated, all 41 firms that have responded to the question reported market price as the
method of valuation of their firms‟ common stock.
As noted above, the use of independent appraisers is the single most commonly used valuation
approach in private firms. We surmise that private firms‟ preference for appraisers could be due to the
limitations faced by them in applying quantitative approaches to valuation of common stock. Further, we
suspect that stockholders of private firms could be preferring independent appraisers over other
approaches with the expectation that they will have expertise and will be unbiased in their estimations.
Alternatively, the preference for valuations by appraisers could be due to issues relating to the ownership
and governance in private firms.
In order to verify which of our above contentions hold, we have examined the differences in the
use of independent appraisers according to ownership groups, firm size, and CEO profiles. The
comparisons are presented in Panel B (Table VI). Among ownership groups, the use of appraisers is most
common in closely-held firms followed by family-owned businesses. Probably, firms in those groups rely
more upon independent appraisers in order to avoid misunderstandings among owners who belong to the
same family or members of closely related families. In size groups, mid-size firms (sales in the range of
$26 to $100 million) are the predominant users of independent appraisers, followed by the firms in the
smallest size group (sales <= $25 million). With regard to the CEO profiles, firms in which CEOs are the
largest shareholders and those in which founders are CEOs have less preference for independent
appraisers than the firms in which CEOs are neither largest shareholders nor founders.
Next, we have examined the „Other valuation approaches‟ specifically stated by the responding
firms. The following are the „Other valuation approaches‟ indicated by one firm for each – (1) An asset
based approach, (2) A formula based on revenue and profits for the last three years, (3) Self assessment
by the single owner, (4) A formula value updated at the fiscal year end by the CPA firm, (5) A multiple
of EBITDA, and (6)As determined by a majority of shareholders.
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III.

Summary
In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations to investigate corporate
governance, illiquidity, and valuation issues in privately owned firms. We also make comparisons with
publicly owned firms. The major findings are as follows.
Written shareholder agreements, although they are important for establishing shareholder rights
and privileges in private firms, are not as common as we expected. Of the corporate matters included in
shareholder agreements, the most prominent ones are those relating to safeguarding equity ownership
interests and dividend payments – (1) sale, transfer, or buy-back of equity owned by shareholders, (2)
proxy and voting procedures, (3) valuation of the company‟s stock, (4) pre-emptive rights, and (5)
dividend payments. On further analysis, we find that in family owned and closely held firms (or in firms
with high concentrations of insider ownership) agreements relating to sale/transfer of stock ownership
are more important. Contrary to this, for stockholders in widely held firms (or in firms with low
concentrations of insider ownership), agreements relating to dividend payments and proxy/voting are
more important.
Family owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms compared to the
dominance of widely held ownership structure in public firms. Insiders of a vast majority of private firms
own over 75 percent of the firm‟s common stock compared to just 2.0 percent of the public-firms in
which insider ownership is in excess of 75 percent. The CEOs of private firms more often than not tend
to be the largest stockholders of their companies which is not the case with public firms (62.8 percent of
private firms versus 22.5 percent of public firms). The sizes of management teams are smaller in private
firms than in public firms. However, the proportion of executives who are also stockholders of the firm is
smaller in private firms than in public firms. This difference appears be due to the availability of stock
option/ownership plans for executives of public firms.
As with the size of management teams, the average size of boards is also smaller in private firms
than in public firms. The proportions of directors who are also on the management team are significantly
larger in private firms, which is indicative of greater inter-linkage between executive teams and board
memberships in private firms and concentration of corporate power in fewer hands. Another interesting
finding is that privately owned firms have a greater percentage of outside directors which is consistent
with the arguments about having outside board members for objectivity and resolving conflicts among
the closely-related stockholders.
Our research also documents the magnitude of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms. No
trading and infrequent trading of common stock was reported by 97.8 percent of private firms which
signifies the high magnitude of illiquidity problems in privately owned common stock. Restrictions on
sale or transfer of ownership interests confound the problem of illiquidity in common stock of private
firms. In close to 60 percent of private firms, stock trading is either prohibited or highly restricted. Also,
in a similar percentage of private firms every sale or transfer of common stock requires approval. At the
other extreme, unrestricted sale/transfer or sale/transfer without the requirement of approvals exist in
slightly more than 20 percent of the private firms. Overall, these findings provide ample evidence not
only about the prevalence of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms which is fairly well known
but also about its magnitude which is a new contribution of this paper.
In valuing common stock, most private firms seem to rely upon the valuation by independent
appraisers/arbitrators rather than valuations based on earnings or cash flow based methods. The use of a
multiples of book-value is the second most popular method in private firms. Further, in privately-owned
firms, valuation by independent appraisers is the predominant method especially in family-owned and
closely-held firms than in widely-held firms. The prominence of valuations by independent appraisers
overall, and more importantly in family-owned and closely-held firms, is consistent with the arguments
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concerning the issues related to the reliability of information in financial statements of private firms and
the objectivity provided by independent appraisers.
In addition to providing valuable empirical evidence on various issues relating to privatelyowned corporations, this research offers guidance for further research in the area and implications for
practitioners. One avenue of further research could focus on soliciting shareholder agreements from
privately-owned corporations and evaluating them from the stand point of corporate governance issues.
Another interesting piece of evidence for further investigation relates to our evidence that outside
directors comprise a larger proportion of directors in family-owned firms than in more broadly owned
private firms or public corporations. Although we rationalized this as a result of the need rely upon
outside talent for the qualities lacking in privately-owned corporations, more research needs to be done in
order to have a better appreciation of this phenomenon. Another interesting evidence concerns the
magnitude of illiquidity in privately-owned firms and valuation of a majority of those firms by
independent appraisers. This finding has immense implications for situations involving sale of
businesses, ESOP purposes as required by ERISA, estate taxes, gift taxes, and litigations of all types. To
further show the importance of our findings in the paper, out of the more than 25 million businesses in
the USA, only 10,000 or so are publicly traded which leaves the vast majority of businesses being valued
by independent appraisers. An interesting extension of this study would to be to conduct a survey of
certified appraisers to examine the approaches used in their evaluations.
In sum, this survey provides some useful insights into the corporate control, illiquidity, and
valuation issues in private firms. While the results are revealing in several ways, the low response rate
may have introduced some bias into the findings reported in the paper. However, the bias does not seem
to be serious since the firms in the mailing list and those responding to the survey are found to be similar
in terms of firm size and the proportion of private versus public firms. Further, we find a high degree of
consistency in responses to questions that are related to each other which is indicative of the diligence
exercised by the individuals responding to the survey in filling out the questionnaire. Yet, findings in this
research are prone to the limitations of any study that relies on survey data for the purpose of empirical
analysis.
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics - Descriptive Statistics
# of Firms

Percent

Privately Owned

202

79.8

Publicly Owned

51

20.2

Total

253

100.0

Panel A: By Ownership Type

All Firms

Panel B: By Business Activity

Private Firms

Public Firms

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Manufacturing

130

51.8

112

56.0

18

35.3

Trading (Wholesale/Retail)

27

10.8

25

12.5

2

3.9

Service

19

7.6

15

7.5

4

7.8

Transportation

8

3.2

6

3.0

2

3.9

Agric., Construction, Mining

24

9.5

22

11.0

2

3.9

Banking & Other Fin Services

19

7.6

10

5.0

9

17.7

Other

24

9.5

10

5.0

14

27.5

Total

251

100.0

200

79.7

51

20.3

Panel C: By Company Size in
Sales

All Firms

Private Firms

Public Firms

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

$25 million or less

154

61.7

140

70.4

14

27.4

$26 - $100 million

54

21.8

44

22.1

10

19.6

Over $100 million

42

16.5

15

7.5

27

53.0

Total

250

100.0

199

100.0

51

100.0

Chi-Square = 62.06; p-Value < 0.0001
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Table 1, continued
Sample Characteristics - Descriptive Statistics
Panel D: Population vs. Sample
All Firms

Private Firms

Public Firms

Sales

Population

Sample

Resp.
Rate

Population

Sample

Resp.
Rate

Population

Sample

Resp.
Rate

<= $100 m

2,522

211

8.4%

2,137

187

8.7%

385

24

6.2%

Column %

87.8

83.4

94.9

92.6

62.2

47.0

> $100 m

348

42

114

15

234

27

Column %

12.2

16.6

4.1

7.4

37.8

53.0

Total

2,870

253

2,251

202

619

51

Column %

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

12.1%

8.8%

13.2%

9.0%

11.5%

8.2%
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Table 2
Written Shareholder Agreements in Firms
Panel A: Question: “Does the company have a „written shareholders‟ agreement?”
All Firms

Private Firms

Public Firms

Yes

120 (49.8%)

102 (52.0%)

18 (40.0%)

No

121 (50.2%)

94 (48.0%)

27 (60.0%)

Column Totals

241 (100.0%)

196 (100.0%)

45 (100.0%)

Chi-Square = 2.12 (p-value = 0.1452)

Panel B: Question: Please indicate if the company has written or established guidelines/procedures relating to:
All Firms
(N=189)

Private Firms
(n=144)

Public Firms
(n=45)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Chi-Sq/
(p-value)

Sale, transfer, or buy-back of equity
owned by shareholders.
(Row %)

124
(65.6)

65
(34.4)

107
(74.3)

37
(25.7)

17
(37.8)

28
(62.2)

20.27
(<.0001)

Proxy and voting procedures.
(Row%)

115
(60.9)

74
(39.1)

71
(49.3)

73
(50.7)

44
(97.8)

1
(2.2)

33.81
(<.0001)

Valuation of the company‟s stock.

77
(40.7)

112
(59.3)

71
(49.3)

73
(50.7)

6
(13.3)

39
(86.7)

18.38
(<.0001)

Payment of dividends to
stockholders.

(Row %)

73
(38.6)

116
(61.4)

50
(34.7)

94
(65.3)

23
(51.1)

22
(48.9)

3.88
(0.049)

Pre-emptive rights in equity offerings
or when someone is selling. (Row %)

62
(32.8)

127
(67.2)

52
(36.1)

92
(63.9)

10
(22.2)

35
(77.8)

3.00
(0.083)

Hiring, compensation, and dismissal
of shareholder-employees. (Row %)

41
(21.7)

148
(78.3)

29
(20.1)

115
(79.9)

12
(26.7)

33
(73.3)

0.86
(0.354)

Mergers, reorganization, or sale of
the firm.
( Row %)

38
(20.1)

151
(79.9)

25
(17.4)

119
(82.6)

13
(28.9)

32
(71.1)

2.84
(0.092)

Protection of interests of minority
shareholders of the firm.
(Row%)

19
(10.1)

170
(89.9)

13
(9.0)

131
(91.0)

6
(13.3)

39
(86.7)

0.703
(0.402)
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Table 2, continued
Written Shareholder Agreements in Firms
Panel C: Private Firms – Further Analysis
Written agreements or established procedures relating to:
Sale/Transfer of stock

By Ownership Type

% of
Firms

Family Owned (n=84)

69.1

Closely Held (n=46)

89.1

Widely Held (n=14)

57.1

Chi-square
(p-value)

Dividend Payments
% of
Firms

Chi-square
(p-value)

25.0
8.67
(0.0131)

45.7
57.1

Proxy / Voting
% of
Firms

Chi-square
(p-value)

39.3
9.03
(0.0109)

58.7
78.6

9.79
(0.0075)

By Insider Ownership
<= 50 percent (n=34)

55.9

51 - 75 percent (n=24)

83.3

Over 75 percent (n=84)

78.6

50.0
7.79
(0.0204)

75.0
32.1

73.5
4.73
(0.0952)

41.7
42.9

9.91
(0.0070)

Is CEO the largest owner?
No (n=54)

72.2

Yes (n=86)

75.6

0.196
(0.6580)

46.3
25.6

6.38
(0.0115)

61.1
40.7

5.53
(0.0187)
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Table 3
Ownership Characteristics
All Firms

Panel A:
Ownership Dispersion

Private Firms

Public Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

Family Owned

130

52.2

129

64.2

1

2.1

Closely Held

69

27.9

57

28.4

12

25.0

Widely Held

50

20.1

15

7.4

35

72.9

Total

249

100.0

199

100.0

48

100

Chi-Square = 111.44; p-value <0.0001

All Firms

Panel B:
Inside Ownership (%)

Private Firms

Public Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

< = 50 percent

93

38.3

48

24.9

45

90.0

51 - 75 percent

31

12.7

27

14.0

4

8.0

> 75 percent

119

49.0

118

61.1

1

2.0

Total

243

100.0

193

100.0

50

100.0

Chi-Square = 73.49; p-value <0.0001
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Table 3, continued
Ownership Characteristics
Panel C:
Is CEO the Largest
Shareholder?

All Firms

Private Firms

Public Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

Yes

131

54.6

120

62.8

11

22.5

No

109

46.4

71

37.2

38

77.5

Total

240

100.0

191

100.0

49

100.0

Chi-Square = 25.65; p-value <0.0001

Panel D:
Is CEO a Founding
Member?

All Firms

Private Firms

Public Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

# of Firms

% of Firms

Yes

77

32.1

60

31.4

17

34.7

No

163

67.9

131

68.6

32

65.3

Total

240

100.0

191

100.0

49

100.0

Chi-Square = 0.4965; p-value = 0.7502
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Table 4
Composition of Management Teams and Board of Directors
Panel A: Management Teams
Private Versus Public Firms
(Paired T-Tests)

# of Executives on
Management Team

# of Executives who are
also Stockholders

% of Executives who
are also Stockholders

n

Mean

n

Mean

n

Mean

Private Firms

196

5.02

189

2.72

189

57.0

Public Firms

49

11.84

48

10.63

48

95.0

All Firms

245

6.38

237

4.32

237

64.7

Mean Diff: Public - Private

6.82

7.91

38.0

F-Ratio (Pooled F Method)

15.73

12.45

4.04

T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.)

6.36

8.30

7.48

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

P-Value
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Table 4, continued
Composition of Management Teams and Board of Directors
Panel B: Composition of Board of Directors
Private Versus Public Firms
(Paired T-Tests)

Total # of
Directors

Directors who are
also Stockholders

Directors who are
also Executives

# of Outside
Directors

n

Mean

n

Mean

n

Mean

n

Mean

Private Firms

196

4.53

193

3.13

194

2.47

202

0.96

Public Firms

51

8.00

50

7.66

51

2.20

51

0.55

All Firms

247

5.24

243

4.06

245

2.42

253

0.88

Mean Diff: Public - Private

3.47

4.53

-0.27

-0.41

F-Ratio (Pooled F Method)

1.56

2.74

1.90

1.77

T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.)

7.77

6.83

-1.25

-1.33

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.2118

0.1853

% of Directors who are
also Executives

% of Outside
Directors

p-Value

% of Directors who are
also Stockholders
n

Mean

n

Mean

n

Mean

Private Firms

191

70.8

192

62.1

195

19.5

Public Firms

50

94.7

51

29.8

51

8.1

All Firms

241

75.8

243

55.3

246

17.2

Mean Diff: Public - Private

23.9

-32.3

-11.4

F-Ratio (Pooled F Method)

4.72

4.55

1.79

T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.)

5.23

-7.48

-2.93

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0037

P-Value
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Table 5
Liquidity of Common Stock Ownership –
Trading Frequency, Restrictions, and Approvals
Never
Firms (Row %)

Infrequent
Firms (Row %)

Frequent
Firms (Row %)

Daily
Firms (Row %)

Row Total
Firms (Row %)

Private

95 (52.2)

83 (45.6)

4 (2.2)

0 (0.0)

182 (100.0)

Public

0 (0.0)

3 (6.0)

6 (12.0)

41 (82.0)

50 (100.0)

95 (40.9)

86 (37.1)

10 (4.3)

41 (7.7)

232 (100.0)

Panel A: Trading
Frequency

Column Total

Chi-Square = 200.68; p-Value <0.0001
Highly
Restricted
Firms (Row %)

Prohibited

Row Total

Firms (Row %)

Somewhat
Restricted
Firms (Row %)

Firms (Row %)

Firms (Row %)

Private

37 (21.1)

36 (20.6)

65 (37.1)

37 (21.1)

175 (100.0)

Public

46 (92.0)

4 (8.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

50 (100.0)

Column Total

83 (36.9)

40 (17.8)

65 (28.9)

37 (16.4)

225 (100.0)

Panel B:
Sale/Transfer
Restrictions

Unrestricted

Chi-Square = 85.53; p-Value <0.0001
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Table 5, continued
Liquidity of Common Stock Ownership –
Trading Frequency, Restrictions, and Approvals

Every Sale/Transfer
Requires Approval
Firms (Row %)

Only Sale/Transfers to
Outsiders Requires
Approval
Firms (Row %)

No Approval Required
for Sale/Transfer of
Stock
Firms (Row %)

Firms (Row %)

Private

92 (59.3)

21 (13.6)

42 (27.1)

155 (100.0)

Public

0

(0.0)

46

(95.8)

48 (100.0)

92

(45.3)

88 (43.4)

203 (100.0)

Panel C:
Sale/Transfer
Approvals

Column Total

2

(4.2)

23 (11.3)

Row Total

Chi-Square = 71.28; p-Value <0.0001
Panel D: Private Firms - Restrictions on Sale or Transfer of Stock Ownership and Trading Frequency
Trading
Frequency

Unrestricted

Highly
Restricted
Firms (Row %)

Prohibited

Row Total

Firms (Row %)

Somewhat
Restricted
Firms (Row %)

Firms (Row %)

Firms (Row %)

Never

10 (11.4)

15 (17.0)

36 (40.9)

27 (30.7)

88 (100.0)

Infrequent

25 (30.1)

19 (22.9)

29 (34.9)

10 (12.1)

83 (100.0)

Frequent

2 (50.0)

2 (50.0)

0 (0.00)

0 (0.00)

4 (100.0)

Column Total

37 (21.1)

36 (20.6)

65 (37.2)

37 (21.1)

175 (100.0)

Chi-Square = 20.96; p-Value = 0.0019
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Table 6
Stock Valuation Approaches in Firms
Panel A:
Private Vs. Public Firms

All Firms
(N=192)

Private Firms
(n=151)

Multiples of Book Value

63 (32.8)

63 (41.7)

0

(0.0)

25.46 (<0.0001)

Multiples of Earnings

8

(4.2)

8 (5.3)

0

(0.0)

2.27 (0.1322)

Discounted Cash Flow

10

(5.2)

0

(0.0)

2.86 (0.0906)

Independent Appraisers

79 (41.2)

79 (52.3)

0 (0.0)

36.45 (<0.0001)

Market Price

41 (21.4)

0 (0.00)

41 (100.0)

191.00 (<0.0001)

Other Approaches

10 (5.21)

10 (6.6)

0 (0.0)

2.86 (0.0906)

10

(6.6)

Public Firms
(n=41)

Chi-Square
(p-value)

Note: Cell values are the number of firms and % of firms within that category.
# of firms in the category are not the column totals as the firms indicated use of more than one approach.
Panel B: Private Firms: Use of Independent Appraisers
Firms Using Appraisers
Ownership Groups

# of Firms

% of Firms

Family Owned (n=94)

49

52.1

Closely Held (n=47)

26

Widely Held (n=9)

4

Firms Using Appraisers
Size Groups

# of Firms

% of Firms

Sales <= $25 m (n=102)

52

51.0

55.3

Sales $26 to $100 m (n=37)

21

56.8

44.4

Sales > $100 m (n=12)

6

50.0

Is CEO the Largest
Shareholder?

Is CEO the Founder?

Yes (n=93)

47

50.5

Yes (n=45)

21

46.7

No (n=57)

32

56.1

No (n=106)

58

54.7

